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Abstract – In this position paper we examine how 
safety could be assured when increasingly complex 
systems are developed using agile software 
development methods. We first discuss the source and 
nature of complexity in software systems and how a 
probe – sense – learn approach recommended by the 
Cynefin Framework is appropriate for designing 
complex systems and a sense – analyse – learn 
approach is appropriate for developing a complicated 
system whose design has been determined. We then 
examine how quality assurance is incorporated into 
agile software development before pointing out that 
those characteristics of a self-managed team that 
produce so many benefits for software development of 
complex systems whose solution evolves with problem 
understanding, are also vulnerable to confirmation 
bias. This suggests that for safety critical system 
development, software systems developed by agile 
teams will need verification and validation by 
independent parties. We review current quality 
management practices for medical device software 
development before discussing how our earlier 
findings could be adopted into safety critical software 
quality management. 
Keywords – Safety critical, software 
development, complex systems, quality assurance 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Safety-critical systems are becoming 
increasingly complex as the number of their 
components, the interactions between the 
components and the interactions with the wider 
sociotechnical systems in which they are embedded 
all increase [1, 2]. In such an environment safety is 
a characteristic that emerges from the components 
themselves and interactions between the different 
parts of the system. Safety-critical systems can also 
fail in complex and unforeseeable ways due to the 
incompatibilities between various components as 
well as their interactions. To manage such 
increasing complexity during both development 
and operation, the Cynefin framework [3, 4] 
suggests using a probe-sense-learn approach 
suitable for complex domains. In software 
development, such an approach best corresponds to 
agile methods’ iterative development and rapid 
customer feedback loops, employing self-
organizing teams of highly skilled individuals. 
Despite various benefits of agile methods, they 
don’t yet incorporate the quality assurance 
practices central to safety-critical systems 
development. In this paper, we argue that some 
quality assurance practices should be incorporated 
into agile software development of safety-critical 
systems to increase reliability and safety of such 
systems. The paper is organized as follows: we first 
describe the complexity of safety-critical systems 
with the example of medical device domain. We 
then provide an overview of the Cynefin 
framework practices that are best suited for the 
complex domain and illustrate the point through the 
uptake of agile methods in safety-critical software 
development today, their benefits as well as their 
shortcomings.  We discuss quality assurance in 
agile development methodologies before discussing 
how quality management for development of safety 
critical devices, medical devices in particular, 
might change in order to take advantage of the 
benefits of agile development without 
compromising the high levels of assurance. 
II. COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Safety-critical systems are growing in 
complexity and becoming more innovative, with 
software being the main source of both their 
complexity and their innovations. Medical devices 
used to be primarily electrical and mechanical 
systems with very little, if any, software. This has 
changed drastically as software systems are now 
essential components of medical device control 
functions. In fact, from 2007, medical devices 
could be solely made up of software if they 
satisfied the medical device definition and operated 
on a general purpose IT platforms intended to be 
placed on the market without a dedicated hardware. 
An example is an iPad application that advises 
doctors on the correct drug dosage amounts for a 
patient [5]. Additional examples include the bionic 
ear, first switched on for a commercial patient in 
1982, and the heart pacemaker that has been 
steadily enhanced since the 1980s. More advanced 
bionic devices are under development and hold 
great promise of significant improvement in their 
recipient’s quality of life. Medical diagnostic 
devices too are advancing technologically, bringing 
with them promises of great health benefits. 
However, technologically advanced devices are 
often complex and, while acknowledging their 
benefits, they also come with the disadvantages of 
complex systems. Even if the medical device was 
simple, it is used within a socio-technical system 
that is itself complex. Try as we might to 
anticipate, to plan, to smooth things out, complex 
systems have global behaviours that emerge 
unpredictably from the interaction of its 
components [6].  
The majority of innovations in medical devices 
today are made to its software component and, as 
with all complex systems, they can behave in 
unexpected ways under some conditions [7]. Since 
there is the potential for harm, safety-critical 
devices must gain regulatory approval before being 
released for use. Often the auditors, who check for 
conformance to all of the relevant regulations, may 
not be able to discover critical errors prior to 
market release, resulting in an increasing number of 
device recalls. In 2011, 24% of all medical device 
recalls in the US (including devices with no 
embedded software) were attributable to software 
errors alone and the trend is growing rapidly [8]. 
III. INNOVATION AND FAILURES 
Creating something novel brings with it a risk 
that the result will be other than what was intended. 
A measure of that risk can be taken from the 
repeated empirical finding that the risk of a new 
product failure is about 40% [9]. That is, the 
product was not a commercial success or did not 
achieve its objectives in one way or another. This is 
not to say that the product itself was faulty, just that 
it was not a commercial success. In some ways this 
can be taken as a measure of our inability to predict 
the outcomes of the complex system of creating a 
new product. It is reasonable to theorise that our 
ability to predict the behaviour of a complex 
software system will be about the same and that 
there will be a 40% unintended and potentially 
harmful effects in any new system. Despite our best 
efforts to understand completely our designs and 
the systems we develop, we are unable to predict 
how that system will behave in the complex 
environment of its deployment. 
An immediate and obvious response to such 
rates of failure would be to increase the amount of 
oversight in the processes of innovation. This has 
been the case for medical devices with an increase 
in regulation following the Therac-25 failure [10]. 
However, increased oversight, in the form of 
regulation and quality management systems, 
impede an organization’s ability to respond to 
market demand or competitive changes [11, 12]. In 
addition, the growing number of product recalls 
indicates that the current regulations, and the 
theories on which they are based, might not be the 
best that can be done. Essentially the problem is to 
determine how to detect and control risks of harm 
arising from innovations in complex medical 
devices. To explore this question we will first 
examine how the Cynefin framework distinguishes 
between complex situations and complicated 
situations, and how it provides strategies for 
dealing with each. Then we will show that software 
development involves both complex and 
complicated processes, and the consequences of 
each. We will explore what these different 
consequences mean for quality assurance in 
software development. Finally we will discuss 
quality assurance for complex medical devices 
before drawing some conclusions. 
IV. CYNEFIN AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
The Cynefin Framework (Figure 1) offers a 
way to make sense of different types of systems 
and situations, providing both symptoms and 
appropriate responses. Although there are five 
distinguishable states in the framework, for this 
paper we will discuss only two; the complicated 
and the complex. 
 
Figure 1: Cynefin Framework 
When the situation is complicated the most 
appropriate response is sense – analyse – respond. 
The situation is knowable, although it may take the 
knowledge of several experts to determine just how 
to sense the situation and then to analyse that 
information in order to know how best to respond. 
In software development an example of 
complicated process might be configuration 
management. In this process there could be 
numerous relationships between the configurable 
items but it would be possible to determine those 
relationships and the state of the overall 
configuration item repository. Similarly the process 
used to build a software system from its various 
components may be complicated but here too there 
is a determinate answer. More subtle perhaps is the 
process of software construction in which the 
designed software is converted into executable 
code. Set aside for a moment the possibility that a 
programming language did not support a necessary 
construct or algorithm. In the absence of such a 
problem, realising a design into the final product is 
a complicated problem but one in which the 
realised product can be verified against its design. 
Defects arising during, or from, a complicated 
processes are defects of production. That is, the 
defect has arisen from a faulty performance of the 
process. This approach seems to have been 
favoured in software development with its 
emphasis on requirements elicitation and analysis, 
and quality management methods taken from 
manufacturing production. Such an approach can 
work well when the situation is knowable. 
When the problem is complex, predicting a 
correct answer, or even what would produce a 
correct answer, becomes difficult if not impossible. 
This situation suits the Cynefin suggested probe – 
sense – learn approach in which something is tried 
that can be used to learn more about both the 
problem and possible solutions. An answer is 
correct in hindsight. For example, software 
development planning usually requires an estimate 
of how long a task will take. Despite years of 
experience the outcomes of estimation remain 
uncertain because no-one can say for certain what 
interruptions they may get, what may prove more 
difficult to do, what might not work as the 
estimator thought it would, and a number of other 
reasons. When the task is done it is then possible to 
say exactly how long it took and precisely why it 
took that long.  
Rather than software development being simply 
a matter of implementing a fully understood 
solution to a problem, software developers now 
participate in the co-evolution of both the business 
problem and its solution. A business problem may 
have several different acceptable solutions 
depending on the available technology and what 
can be achieved within the applicable constraints. 
At the start of development there will be some 
projections of what system components must be 
developed, and how they must be developed, in 
order to deliver the required features and qualities. 
Invariably there are some parts of the system that 
won’t work as we thought they should work, or the 
functionality provided by some component does 
not work the way we thought it worked. Whatever 
the reason our predictions are not realised and it is 
only after completion are we able to say exactly 
how the system was built and why it was necessary 
to build it that way. At this point it is useful to 
distinguish between software design and software 
production. For the purposes of this argument 
software design includes all of the activities that 
discover, determine or decide what software 
constructs are necessary to provide the functions 
and features that will provide an acceptable 
solution to the problem. Software production 
includes all of the activities that realise that design 
in the form of an executable software system. 
Design can occur at a high level, when the overall 
architecture of the system is decided, at the low 
level, when the implementation details of an 
algorithm are decided, and all points in between. 
The point of distinguishing between software 
design and software production is that each 
requires a different approach and different forms of 
quality control. Software design is complex. The 
outcome is difficult to predict but will make sense 
in hindsight. An appropriate strategy for software 
design is probe – sense – learn that is achieved 
quite well through incremental development so 
typical of agile software development methods. 
Software production, converting a completed 
software design into executable software, can be 
complicated but is not complex. The eventual state 
of the executable software is entirely predictable 
even if the means of production is difficult and may 
require the combined efforts and expertise of 
several experts. Software production suits a sense – 
analyse – respond approach where past production 
is sensed, the resulting data analysed and used to 
modify and improve the production methodology. 
However, software development seldom happens in 
a two-step process where the system is first 
designed then produced, but in a single pass in 
which one approach dominates and the other is 
accommodated as best it can be. There are 
exceptions to this, the most obvious being when 
there is some form of prototype or proof of concept 
developed before the main development. 
Software development has more of the 
characteristics of a design problem than a 
production problem; complex and fully 
understandable only in hindsight. 
The terms “science” and “design” used to label 
the different approaches to problem solving could 
be applied to this discussion. Complicated 
problems and situations seem to suit a science 
approach, based on deduction and induction, 
because they are knowable. Complex problems do 
not suit a science approach because the problem is, 
to some degree, unknowable. Lawson [13] found 
that science graduates tended to solve problems by 
first understanding their structure before venturing 
an answer whereas architecture graduates tended to 
explore the problem by generating a number of 
solutions as a way of exploring the problem until 
one of the solutions proved acceptable. Several 
explanations of how designers work have proposed 
similar explanations – that designers use abduction 
to generate a possible solution, then evaluate the 
solution against its constraints and requirements 
rather than use induction or deduction [see e.g.14, 
15]. The systems analysis based approach of 40 
years ago has all the characteristics of fully 
exploring the problem until it is understood well 
enough that the best solution can be formulated, in 
the form of specifications for a system to be 
developed. Agile software development, in all its 
various forms, uses the design approach by 
producing a small part of the system and evaluating 
its acceptability, then using what has been learnt 
about the problem to develop more of the system. 
The agile approach explores the problem by 
producing and testing possible solutions. Such an 
approach carries with it the risk that a seemingly 
feasible solution is later revealed to be feasible only 
for a subset of possible situations. In design terms, 
it was a local optimum and the solution search 
stopped prematurely. 
Software systems themselves can be complex 
and adaptive. During development the design and 
implementation of different software components 
can change to adjust to one or more components 
with which they interact. For example, there may 
be a business requirement of X, say, which could 
be satisfied by system functionality Y. However, 
on investigation or during system architecture 
design or even later in the development life cycle it 
is discovered that system functionality Y cannot be 
delivered or will not satisfy X. Possibly business 
requirement X might now be modified, along with 
all other business requirements impacted by this 
change in X. In turn this has a flow on effect to 
system functionality Z. Another example is when a 
component might interface to a database sub-
system or a protocol stack for which there are 
vendor supplied interface components. If the 
vendor changes those interface components then 
the effects of those changes propagate through the 
system under construction, possibly back to the 
conception of the business problem itself. The 
eventual states of software elements are 
retrospectively coherent, whether requirements, 
design or code. That is, only after completion it is 
possible to say exactly how they happened and why 
they finished up that way, but not before 
completion. 
V. QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN AGILE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Agile software development, in its various 
forms, has been described in books, blogs, 
conference papers, journal articles and trade press. 
The essential characteristics of the various forms of 
agile software development are those that enable a 
problem to be explored by generating potential 
solutions and evaluating those solutions in order to 
discover more about the problem. Additionally 
agile teams are usually small, self-managing and 
comprised of a majority of experienced developers. 
They are small enough that they can coordinate 
their work using informal mutual adjustment rather 
than the more formal methods required of larger 
teams. Self-management is enabled by their 
knowledge and experience in software 
development, and is necessitated by the variability 
of the work at any stage. Self-management also 
enables the team to respond quickly to changing 
situations. Their knowledge and experience with 
software development means that most of the time 
agile teams do not need much supervision and 
don’t need to be supported by formal software 
development or quality management processes. 
Instead, these teams, for the most part, are able to 
determine for themselves what objectives they 
should pursue, and to devise a process for that 
specific pursuit. Importantly, teams seem to decide 
how their work should be verified and validated.  
Largely missing from the innumerable 
discussions about agile software development is 
acknowledgement of the trade-offs that have been 
made to enable the speed and responsiveness of 
agile development versus the rigour of plan-based 
development. There is a fondness for citing the 
“Agile Manifesto” without acknowledging that the 
people who developed it were all very experienced 
and skilled developers. They didn’t need the 
support or constraints of formal software 
development methods but had, instead, acquired 
and would apply very sound professional practices 
that achieved all of the same objectives that a 
formal development method would do. However, 
being very experienced and with sound 
professional practices, they were able to vary their 
development method to suit the circumstances. 
Developing a proof of concept does not need 
rigorous quality management and it doesn’t matter 
if the resulting system is riddled with bugs so long 
as it proves or disproves the concept. The full 
rigour of a formal development method simply 
hinders innovation and responsiveness [12]. At the 
other end of the scale, using less than the full rigour 
of a formal development method when developing 
a large critical system is likely to produce a lower 
quality system. After all it was to achieve such high 
quality levels that rigorous methods were 
developed. Between those two extremes of very 
fast responsive development that depends on very 
experienced software developers and very careful 
development that can support inexperienced 
developers lies the broad range of agile 
development methods in which experienced 
professionals can adjust their development methods 
to suit the circumstances. Alistair Cockburn tries to 
formalise such a range in his Crystal 
Methodologies [16]. 
The verification and validation practices are of 
most interest for this discussion. Agile advocates 
do encourage some forms of independent check. 
That could be a peer review, pair programming or 
some variation. Importantly, that review is by a 
peer, someone capable of understanding what 
needs to be done, what has been done and why. A 
second common form of validation is unit testing, 
also normally performed by the developers 
themselves. But most attention is concentrated on 
the developer’s perspective and interests, not a 
quality assurance perspective. For example, texts 
describing the various forms of agile development 
do not dwell on what happens once the software 
has been developed nor on the forms of 
independent verification and validation. Although 
agile development can support very high standards 
of software quality there is no guarantee that this 
will always happen. 
An important difference between agile 
development teams and the more traditional project 
staffing is that the agile team is expected to be 
sufficiently skilled that all tasks can be completed 
by the team alone whereas the traditional team 
continues the long established industrial practice of 
skill specialisation. For a traditional project, within 
a functional organization work flows through 
different specialisations or, in a matrix 
organization, different specialisations are called 
upon at different times during the project. While 
this increases the coordination overhead and can 
slow a project down it does mean that, potentially, 
the best available knowledge and skills can be 
used. 
Agile teams depend on their collective 
knowledge and skills being good enough for the 
project. The agile approach seems to have provided 
acceptable quality for a lot of projects but there is 
very little empirical information available on 
quality control practices and outcomes of agile 
teams compared to traditional teams. On the 
surface of it, a team of specialists should be able to 
achieve higher quality related outcomes than a 
team of generalists. Yet domains other than 
software development also must achieve high 
performance in complex situations. 
VI. HIGH PERFORMANCE TEAMS 
In a study into high performance teams such as 
you might find in surgery, nuclear power plant 
operation, chemical processing and flight deck 
operations, Weick et al [17] identify several 
characteristic behaviours of highly reliable 
organizations. Weick et al list these as; 
• preoccupation with failure,  
• reluctance to simplify,  
• sensitivity to operations,  
• commitment to resilience, and  
• deference to expertise 
These characteristics may also occur in many 
software development teams but how could their 
practice be demonstrated? How could they be 
audited? A preoccupation with failure could be 
demonstrated through a “Definition of Done,” a 
checklist of work to be completed before the work 
can be considered potentially shippable [18]. Such 
a checklist and its successful completion would 
qualify as an auditable record. Potentially, a 
definition of done is also a place where lessons 
learnt from past failures could be recorded.  
Reluctance to simplify things and a sensitivity 
to operations are also present in agile teams when 
the team includes or seeks input from end users and 
problem owners. While this might not always be 
true, it is far more possible than when developers’ 
understanding of what needs to be done is 
separated from operations by layers of 
specifications and organizational distance. 
One of the characteristics of high performance 
teams that might be hard to audit is their 
commitment to resilience, which shows through 
their learning from failures, their abilities to detect, 
contain, and bounce back from errors that are part 
of an indeterminate world [19]. In software 
development such resilience could be evident 
through a record of process review and 
improvement, multiple reviews of work in 
progress, multiple opportunities to detect and 
correct faults in the software. Within agile 
development is the practice of holding a 
retrospective. Retrospectives provide opportunities 
to consider what worked well, what failed, what 
could be improved and, more importantly, what 
should be done to affect those improvements. Like 
most software development practices, can be 
performed well or poorly but whether done well or 
not they provide a means to learn from failures, to 
achieve some level of resilience. 
The final characteristic of high reliable 
organizations is a deference to expertise, which 
requires diversity to help detect more in a complex 
environment and helps to do more with the 
complexities they find. One of the differentiating 
characteristics of agile software development is that 
roles are not specialized. Instead, team members 
exercise their specific expertise when it is required 
but otherwise do whatever is necessary on the day. 
In complex, changeable, critical, time-
dependant situations high performance teams are 
characterised by some behaviours that could 
usefully be adopted by agile development teams. 
There is, however, a critical difference between the 
high performance teams studied by Weick et al and 
teams developing critical software systems: 
software development is not so time critical that 
decisions cannot be reviewed. 
VII. CONFIRMATION BIAS 
Although the structure, culture and practices of 
agile software development can demonstrate many 
of the characteristics of highly reliable 
organizations, they have their weaknesses. As 
Weick notes, a subtle trap that many of those who 
need to manage the unexpected is that they fail to 
describe the important mistakes people should 
guard against in pursuit of their objectives [19: p9]. 
The agile development practice of allowing 
development within the core team to be verified 
and validated by the team itself is vulnerable to 
confirmation bias. That is, a developer and a 
development team knows what the software is 
intended to do so will tend to conduct tests and 
seek evidence to confirm that the software does 
what is intended. This is not negligence or 
incompetence by the development team but simple 
seeking evidence or interpreting evidence 
according to an established belief [20]. Khaneman 
[21] argues that “the operations of associative 
memory contribute to confirmation bias.” 
Philosophers of science may advise testing 
hypotheses by deliberately trying to refute them but 
most others, Kahneman argues, will tend to seek 
data that are compatible with the beliefs they 
currently hold. Turner [22] cites a number of cases 
where entire organizations held beliefs that were 
later contradicted with fatal consequences. One that 
was especially tragic was the belief that safety in 
coal mines concerned what happened underground 
and that anything above ground was not a concern. 
Mine spoil was tipped on a hill above a village but 
the dangers of doing so were not regarded as a 
matter of mine safety. After many years and in very 
wet conditions the spoil slid down the hill in the 
form of a slurry to bury parts of the village beneath. 
A software system may be intended for a specific 
purpose but that does not mean it will achieve its 
intentions, or that the purpose will remain constant 
or that it will be used for that purpose alone.  
To overcome confirmation bias, to effect a truly 
independent audit of the developed software, the 
developer would need to document what their 
requirements were, what decisions they made about 
implementing those requirements and the rationale 
for doing so, and probably need to document the 
code itself just so that it could all be found and 
understood by someone not already familiar with 
the development. This introduces some formality, 
reduces development speed and responsiveness. 
Suddenly it starts looking like formal process-based 
development. 
To some degree test driven development (TDD) 
[23] does try to overcome the tendency for a 
developer to believe their software does what they 
intend it should. However a developer is unlikely to 
understand how a user might use the system or the 
full circumstances in which the system could be 
used so is unlikely to construct tests that fully 
exercise the system. Any number of test specialists 
and authorities (e.g. James Bach, Cem Kaner, 
Michael Bolton, Rex Black) would argue that a 
critical system is unlikely to be tested as well by a 
developer as it would be by a specialist tester. 
Safety critical software, indeed all critical 
software, seems to require some design practices 
and apply some design constraints, require some 
development practices and apply some 
development constraints. Since a major reason of 
adopting agile software development methods is to 
support problem and solution co-evolution, and a 
process approach to quality management would 
compromise the essential innovation and 
responsiveness, ways of achieving high quality of 
and during design requires a different approach. 
The high performance team approach described by 
Weick et al provides a promising way forward on 
this. However, even the most complex and novel 
software must be realised into executable code at 
some stage and that is where the more familiar 
process based approach to software quality can be 
applied. 
VIII. QUALITY MANAGEMENT FOR MEDICAL 
DEVICE SOFTWARE. 
Quality management for medical devices is 
dominated by the regulations and guidance 
published by European Commission [5, 24-26] and  
the US Food and Drug Administration [27]. An 
explicit FDA guidance on general principles of 
software validation [28] takes a process approach 
to quality assurance in which a process uses 
resources to transform inputs into outcomes. Of 
central importance to the FDA guidance are the 
processes for verification and validation which are 
harmonised with ISO 8402:1994 and which treats 
“verification” and “validation” as separate and 
distinct terms. Verification “provides objective 
evidence that the design outputs of a particular 
phase of the software development life cycle meet 
all of the specified requirements for that phase” 
whereas validation seeks “confirmation by 
examination and provision of objective evidence 
that software specifications conform to user needs 
and intended uses, and that the particular 
requirements implemented through software can be 
consistently fulfilled.” The guidance dismisses 
verification in a single paragraph but devotes more 
than 25 pages to validation, describing the 
principles, the activities and tasks of validation. 
These are modelled on the validation process of 
ISO 15288 [29] where processes are described in a 
way that assumes a flow of work and control from 
inputs to outputs. That is, the input to the process is 
specified at the beginning and it is up to the process 
to deliver outputs that reflect those inputs. The 
processes of ISO 15288, and ISO 12207 that 
preceded it, reflect the needs of large organizations 
to define processes in a way that supports 
contractual distributed development. Potentially 
each process could be contracted to a different 
supplier. When work is distributed and governed by 
contracts it makes sense to validate process outputs 
against their requirements and to verify that the 
process activities have been performed effectively. 
This type of quality management assumes that the 
whole will be a sum of its parts and that correct 
functioning of the parts will assure correct 
functioning of the whole. But a complex system 
produces emergent outcomes from interactions 
among the parts. Even though the parts may 
function correctly, the overall system may function 
incorrectly. 
It is difficult to anticipate all possible 
combinations of interactions between parts of a 
complex system and, as Perrow [30] points out, 
accidents arise from unexpected combinations. This 
becomes a problem of determining where accidents 
are likely, then testing to see that the system 
prevents or avoids such accidents. To date software 
testers have adopted several strategies to maximise 
testing return for effort. Among the strategies are 
risk based testing and scenario testing which, in 
different ways, consider possible circumstances in 
which a software system failure would have 
significant consequences. Since people have a bias 
toward confirming what they believe to be true 
(subjective dissonance), efforts to think of possible 
failures tend not to include those circumstances of 
combinations believed unlikely or impossible [31]. 
Industries other than those developing medical 
devices have this same problem of assuring safety 
within the unpredictability of a complex system 
and they share some common characteristics, as 
previously discussed. In high performance 
organizations safety is not assured through 
compliance, although compliance may contribute 
toward safety, but through preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience and deference 
to expertise [17].  
IX. DISCUSSION 
Agile software development combines problem-
solving, design and software production. It is the 
iterative nature of agile software development that 
supports gradual understanding, evolving and 
refining an acceptable solution. Within the problem 
solving cycle there is design of potential solutions 
or design of refinements to existing systems. 
Designs are usually evaluated against guidelines, 
constraints and other knowledge about feasible 
designs. Although the software development 
community has many guidelines, few have been 
formalised into any quality management system. 
Design rules, coding standards, object-oriented 
design guidelines are freely available and easily 
tailored to a specific organization or situation, and 
they are the easiest place to manage knowledge 
about software development. Industry leading 
companies are adopting some very advanced design 
guidelines. An example is the O-O object design 
SOLID principles and specializations [32]. As 
systems become larger and more complex, it 
becomes important to apply these design principles 
more rigorously. Agile software development 
methods seem increasingly to be adopting a 
“Definition of Done” to ensure all those actions 
that should be done before the software can be 
considered potentially shippable have been 
completed. The “Definition of Done” provides a 
checklist that can be updated to reflect lessons 
learnt from previous failures. 
Designs must be realized by being converted 
into a functioning system while retaining fidelity 
with the design. Such realization is closer to 
production than it is to design and this is where the 
accumulated experience with quality assurance can 
be applied. This is where it is much more possible 
to plan, to use established processes with much 
greater confidence of achieving the expected result. 
Again this can be expressed only as being more 
confident of the result because much of the detailed 
design of a software system is done during coding, 
especially during agile development. To fully 
separate design from the much more predictable 
realization of that design would require re-
establishing the habit of performing detailed design 
before and separate from coding itself. This inserts 
formality into the development process, bringing it 
closer to the specification and plan-based 
development and seems unnecessary since a certain 
amount of design during implementation seems to 
be manageable without everything becoming 
unpredictable. It seems a matter of degree that 
many organizations have managed to establish, 
given the number who claim to be using agile 
methods, for what otherwise seem to be routine 
development projects. 
With a complex system it is not only the 
integrity of a component that matters but also 
interactions between components. The separate 
components of a system could be correctly 
implemented but the design itself may be flawed. 
The Therac-25 failure was a failure of design, not 
of implementation. While there are a number of 
ways to check the correctness and integrity of a 
program, the ways of checking a design for 
correctness or, in this case, safety, are less well 
known. With a complex system it becomes 
impossible to prove that the system will be safe 
because an unsafe outcome could arise from a 
combination of events, usually an unexpected 
combination [30]. Rather than demand that all 
possible combinations of events be tested it would 
be better to follow the example of high reliability 
organizations that have already adopted a mindset 
and behaviours that guide the organization to 
prevent unsafe outcomes. 
Software developers individually have 
produced some rules or guidance about what works 
well and what to avoid. At the most abstract are 
‘patterns’ and for which the Portland Pattern 
Repository is probably the most well-known. 
Object-oriented design has thrown up some 
guidelines for well-designed objects; the SOLID 
guidelines. Most programming languages have at 
least one set of coding rules, often with a tool to 
evaluate some code for breaches of the rules. Rules 
or guidance, and compliance to them, won’t assure 
safety simply because the situation can throw up 
new outcomes faster than the rules can be 
developed to prevent them. Instead safety must be 
assured through behaviours that use but do not stop 
at the available rules and guidance. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Medical device software system development 
will inevitably adopt an agile approach in order to 
deal with complex problems and situations. Agile 
software development offers safety critical 
developers more than the usual advantages of self-
management and responsiveness during problem 
discovery. Team composition and many of the agile 
practices coincide quite well with practices found 
in highly reliable organizations so can be expected 
to higher quality, more resilient software systems. 
However, agile software development teams do 
not necessarily always perform or support those 
practices. Critically agile development teams, 
without some review of their development by a 
party external to the development team itself, are 
vulnerable to confirmation bias since they know 
how the software system is intended to work and 
are highly unlikely to think of how it could fail to 
work. If they could, they would have prevented that 
potential failure during development anyway. So 
any claim that the developed software system is 
safe would normally require some external 
demonstration that this is so. This would lead to 
some formal communication between the 
development team and the verification and 
validation team. 
Agile software development methods support 
problem-solving and design much better than 
traditional plan-based methods but so far it seems 
that methods to review software system design 
have remained informal, relying on the professional 
skills of the developers and not on formal methods 
of validation. Design faults usually are more subtle 
and of more consequence than production faults so 
developers of software systems for critical systems, 
medical device systems in particular, should 
consider how software and system designs might 
be validated. 
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